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Parametric Preference Functionals Under Risk in the Gain Domain: A Bayesian
Analysis
Abstract
The performance of rank dependent preference functionals under risk is comprehensively evalu-
ated using Bayesian model averaging. Model comparisons are made at three levels of heterogeneity
plus three ways of linking deterministic and stochastic models: the di¤erences in utilities, the di¤er-
ences in certainty equivalents and contextual utility. Overall, the "best model", which is conditional
on the form of heterogeneity is a form of Rank Dependent Utility or Prospect Theory that cap-
tures the majority of behaviour at both the representative agent and individual level. However,
the curvature of the probability weighting function for many individuals is S-shaped, or ostensibly
concave or convex rather than the inverse S-shape commonly employed. Also contextual utility
is broadly supported across all levels of heterogeneity. Finally, the Priority Heuristic model, pre-
viously examined within a deterministic setting, is estimated within a stochastic framework, and
allowing for endogenous thresholds does improve model performance although it does not compete
well with the other specications considered.
1. Introduction
There is a long history of research questioning the validity of Expected Utility Theory (EUT),
with many economists wishing to apply non EUT theories to problems relating to decisions under
risk. Within the literature some degree of consensus appears to have emerged that probability
weighting models such as Prospect Theory (PT) or Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) o¤er the best
alternative to EUT (Wakker, 2010; Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012). Yet, while the scope for ap-
plications of PT and RDU is increasing (see Barberis, 2013, and Schleifer, 2012), the growth of
empirical applications is arguably less than one might expect given their theoretical prominence.
One potential reason is that the range of parametric variants of these theories can itself be ba­ ing,
and perhaps may inhibit their adoption. Therefore, this paper reconsiders the appropriate selection
of parametric specications of choice under risk within the gain domain.
While there is plenty of evidence that most economic agents do not seem to unerringly use
probabilities as summative linear weights to utilities of outcomes, what they actually do remains
the subject of debate. Leading critics of EUT include Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and more
recently Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001), who consider the weight of evidence against
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EUT su¢ cient to label it an ex-hypothesis. In contrast, Birnbaum (2006) argues a case against
probability weighting of the PT form, and more recently, the unfavourable implications for EUT
from the concavity-calibration argument of Rabin (2000) have been challenged by Cox and Sadiraj
(2006) and Cox et al. (2012) on the grounds that calibration arguments lead to equally problematic
implications for nonlinear probability weighting. Furthermore, models in which outcomes are
weighted by functions of probabilities have also been challenged at the process level (Fiedler and
Glockner, 2012).
The understanding that emerges from the literature is further muddied by the fact that individ-
uals may use di¤erent (and multiple) strategies. For example, Bruhin et al. (2010) report results
that indicate that at least 20% of respondents in their experiments can be classied as EUT types,
while Harless and Camerer (1994), and Hey and Orme (1994) have presented analysis of a range of
theories and models suggesting that no one theory clearly outperformed all others. There is also
the important question about how best to nest what are ostensibly deterministic theories within
a stochastic setting. As Hey and Orme (1994) observed, while the issue of "noise" has often been
treated as an ancillary one, it deserves greater attention such as the research presented by Wilcox
(2011).
In practice, for applied researchers examining decision making under risk the implications of the
above for conducting research come down to a choice of appropriate functional forms. Thus, the
choice of functional forms to be employed to operationalise the theory is key and even if researchers
narrow the range of candidate models to within the PT or RDU class1, they face an enormous
set of potential models. Furthermore, the literature is still unable to give denitive advice in
this regard mainly because there are so many potential combinations of functional forms that are
used to model the di¤erent aspects such as value (utility), probability transformations and those
linking the deterministic models to stochastic outcomes. Each of these model aspects interacts
with others to determine overall model performance and there is a need to understand how di¤erent
model aspects perform in combination.
The data employed here is from Stott (2006), which to date provides one of the most compre-
hensive studies of the performance of a range of functionals characterising PT in the gain domain.
The results reported in Stott are frequently cited for the choice of functionals employed in PT/RDU
research (e.g., Bruhin et al., 2010). Unlike Stott (2006) we employ a Bayesian approach to the
1We use PT to mean its cumulative variant which is sometimes termed Cumulative Prospect Theory.
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analysis of this data. The analysis in Stott (2006) and Booij et al. (2010) are typical in that
they have been conducted from a classical perspective using maximum likelihood as the estima-
tion method. However, serious issues emerge in deciding on an optimal combination of functional
forms when there are so many combinations of competing specications. Also, as noted by Booij
et al. (2010) the wrong choice of a functional form can result in contamination and bias of other
estimates of parameters. In this paper, we exploit the advantages of Bayesian Model Averaging
(BMA) which provides an internally consistent and coherent approach to this type of modeling
problem. Like Stott (2006), we examine a large number of functional forms at the individual
as well as the aggregate level. Furtermore, we examine and compare specications based on the
contextual utilityapproach developed in Wilcox (2011), a generalisation of the Priority Heuristic
(PH) developed in Brandstätter et al. (2006), and the Transfer of Attention Exchange(TAX)
weighting function of Birnbaum and Chavez (1997). The TAX and PH models are examined as
they are viewed as alternatives to PT/RDU and in both cases positive experimental evidence has
been presented.
The di¢ culty in deciding on an optimal specication for this type of problem stems from the
very large model space. Classical pairwise comparison of nested models can be made using a
range of standard tests (e.g. Likelihood Ratio, F, Wald) providing appropriate adjustment is made
for cases where parameters lie on the edge of the parameter space or alternatives are restricted
to a subset of possible values (e.g. Andrews, 1998). Classical non-nested models can also be
tested using the methods developed by Vuong (1989) and others.2 However, when the number of
potential models is very large, pairwise testing implies an extremely large number of tests3, whereby
the transitivity of these tests is not assured in nite samples (Findley, 1990). This means that an
unambiguous ranking of models is di¢ cult. Information criteria (IC) o¤er an alternative way to
evaluate models. However, while IC are additive over individuals (when models are estimated at
the individual level), the formal basis for using them as model weights is through their asymptotic
approximation of logged marginal likelihoods. The use of IC in Bayesian Analysis of Classical
Estimates has been motivated by the desire to avoid informative priors (e.g. Sala-i-Martin et
al., 2004). Yet as shown in Fernandez et al. (2001) the choice of alternative g-priors leads to
asymptotically di¤erent IC, which rather weakens the claim that using IC means that one is less
2See Pesaran and Weeks (2007) for an overview.
3There are (n-1)n/2 combinations, which for the current paper means that the number of pairwise comparisons
are of the order 109.
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dependent on priors. In contrast, full BMA provides an internally consistent and coherent approach
to this problem, providing one can provide priors. In the context of PT, we believe that there is
substantive theoretical and previous empirical evidence that give a basis for setting these priors,
and we examine this in detail.
We are also concerned here with explicitly recognising that model selection may depend on
whether one is seeking an overarching model that explains aggregate behaviour, or whether one
is seeking models that allow heterogeneity in behaviour. To follow our clothing analogy, let us
imagine that our goal is to select the best style of hat. If we are constrained to dressing all
individuals in exactly the same clothes, our choice of hat style may be quite di¤erent to when we
allow the styles and colours of other items of clothing to di¤er across individuals. As discussed
in Andersen et al. (2008), arguments for and against models have sometimes been implicitly or
explicitly based on the idea of a representative agentwhere it is assumed that there exists a
common model of behaviour across all individuals both in the preference functionals and forms
and the parameters that characterise those functionals (e.g., Brandstätter et al., 2006). However,
what has been insu¢ ciently recognised is that choosing a singular specication that best represents
all individuals is a di¤erent task from choosing multiple specications that represent di¤erent
groups of individuals. Di¤erent people may do di¤erent things when it comes to making decisions.
For example, it is possible that some may employ a heuristic like the PH, and others adhere to
PT. In this paper we recognise that optimal model specication may di¤er depending on whether
the researcher seeks a model that performs best when applied to all individuals; or whether one is
interested in explaining individuals behaviour. Importantly, there may be models that do extremely
well in explaining the behaviour of a subgroup of individuals, but do very badly if applied to all
individuals.
When parametric models are being estimated, there are three levels of heterogeneity that are
commonly applied. Level 0 is where individuals share functional forms and have the same parame-
ters values (i.e., the representative agents. Level 1is where individuals share functional forms but
with potentially heterogenous parameter values. And Level 2 is where individuals need not share
functional forms or parameter values.
Heterogeneity in parameters can be introduced, in a limited sense, by allowing the parameters
to be conditioned on covariates, but more general models include those that are either a latent class
model (or nite mixture of distributions) or a random parameter (or Heirachical Bayes) approach
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(e.g. Nilsson et al., 2011). Heterogeneity in models can be introduced using the weighted likelihood
approach outlined in Harrison and Rustrom (2009) and related approaches in Bruhin et al. (2010)
and Conte et al. (2011). In contrast, a number of papers, (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994, Birnbaum
and Chavez, 1997, and Stott 2006) have estimated multiple models at the individual level. This
approach is exible in terms of model estimation, but also requires large amounts of information to
be collected at the individual level. Studies that have pursued this approach typically o¤er a very
large number of choices (e.g. 100 or more) to each person. While an individual specic approach
is exible, it is clearly less than optimal if there is an overarching framework that is able to allow
heterogeneity on one hand, but allowing the pooling of information across individuals to estimate
parameters that are common to all.
In this paper, we consider the model performance at all three levels which involves estimating
models at the representative agent level (Level 0) and the individual level (Level 2). Inference
about Level 1 specications can be examined by using the Level 2 models, and calculating the log
marginal likelihoods with the common model restrictions imposed. That is, there is no additional
estimation required for Level 1 models, once all Level 2 models have been estimated.
The paper proceeds by describing general framework and specic models in Section 2. Section
3 discusses our approach to model comparison and model estimation. Our results are presented
and discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2. Model Descriptions
The choices under risk that are evaluated within this paper were elicited using a gamble format
with a discrete number of payo¤s (See Stott (2006) for specic details). The prospect (g) is of the
form
gi =

fpikgKik=1 ; fxikgKik=1

(1)
where fpikg are the probabilities and fxikg are the monetary payo¤s where, without loss of gener-
ality, it is assumed that they have been ordered xi1  xi2; ::::  xiKi : In the empirical part of the
paper Ki = 2 for all prospects, but we shall discuss the theory more generally.
Common to all economic models used to examine this type of data is the idea that there is
to some degree, compensatory behaviour (i.e. respondents make trade-o¤s) with regard to both
the payo¤s in the prospects and the probabilities of obtaining those payo¤s. As such we refer to
this general class of models as compensatory. In this sense PT/RDU and TAX are compensatory
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models.
In contrast within the psychology literature the idea that people apply heuristics (i.e., a decision
process) that do not necessarily imply such trade-o¤s is commonplace. A popular example of a
heuristic is the PH introduced by Brandstätter et al. (2006). Although the PH has proven very
popular within the literature it has been the subject of criticism as well (see Birnbaum, 2008, and
Brandstätter et al., 2008).
Note we will refer to the non-TAX, non-linear compensatory models as being PT models. Also
as we are dealing with models in only the gain domain, there is nothing really to distinguish PT
models from RDU models, subject to the fact that payo¤s are not be evaluated relative to wealth,
but around a reference point of zero. However, for simplicity we shall use the term PT only.
2.1. Compensatory Specications
The compensatory models specied in this paper are dened by four key components. We refer
to these as aspectsof the model and they are: i) Value v; ii) Probability weighting (P-weight) w;
iii) Inner Link ~; and, iv) Outer Link .
Each aspect may take a number of specic functional formsfrom a dened set: v 2 V , w 2 W ;
~ 2 ~ and  2 .4 Each form of each aspect has a particular parameter space except for the Inner
Link which does not contain any free parameters (i.e. they cannot be dened di¤erently by setting
parameter values).
In this paper we will (as we outline below) combine six v with seven w, three ~ and ve  and.
Therefore, the number of combinations is 6  7  3  5 = 630: However, because the constant
probability  is dependent only on the sign (not magnitude) of the signal from the deterministic
component, models with this  are invariant to the nature of the ~, so the actual number of models
we estimate is slightly smaller, 549 once the three PH models are taken into account. These
549 models need to be estimated at the representative agent level, and for every individual in our
sample for Level 2 models, thus, requiring approximately 50,000 models to be estimated in total.
2.1.1. Value Forms (v-forms)
The v aspect evaluates the preference for a monetary amount that will be given with certainty.
We employ six forms commonly encountered in the literature:
4Note that in this paper we employ the term "Link" in a di¤erent manner than that used in Stott (2006) who
refers to the "choice" function, which corresponds to what we call the outer link.
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POWER-I : v (x) = x1 : 1 > 0 (2)
EXPO-I : v (x) = 1  e 2x : 2 > 0
LOG : v (x) = ln (1 + 3x) : 3 > 0
QUAD : v (x) = x  4x
2
2
: 4 > 0; 4 <
2
xmax
POWER-II v (x) = (5 + x)
6 : 5 > 0; 6 > 0
EXPO-II : v (x) = 1  e 7x8 : 7 > 0; 0:5 < 8 < 1:5
For all of our v-forms, the set of parameter restrictions ensures that the value function is always
monotonically increasing. This is obvious for POWER-I, EXPO-I and LOG. For the functional
form QUAD, xmax is the largest payo¤ out of all the prospects, and the parameter restrictions
ensure that the function is monotonically increasing in value over the range of the data. Also, in
our analysis x is normalised by dividing through by xmax prior to estimation such that x only varies
between 0 and 1.
We also note that some of the v-forms appear in the literature with di¤erent names. For
example, the POWER-II is also referred to as the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion function, and
the EXPO-II is the Power-Expo-Utility function. However, since our set of restrictions on these
value forms are somewhat more restrictive than those applied in the literature, we use the terms
above to signal that they are generalisations of the POWER-I and EXPO-I.
2.1.2. P-Weight Forms (w-forms)
The w aspect transforms the probability of obtaining the monetary amount into some other
measure that lies between 0 and 1. All the w-forms operate on the cumulative probability function
except the TAX model of Birnbaum and Chavez (1997) which operates on the probabilities of the
ranked outcomes. Assuming the prospects have been ordered as xi1  xi2; ::::  xiKi then the
probability weights are constructed directly on the probabilities (rather than the cumulative)
TAX:
w (pi)=
p
3
i   1n+1
Pn
j=i+1 p
3
i +
1
n+1
Pi 1
j=1 p
3
jP
j p
3
j
: 0 < 3 < 2
(3)
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For PT w-forms yield the weighting based on the cumulative or decumulative distributions and
take the form
w1 = w (p1)
and (4)
wj = w
 
jX
i=1
pi
!
  w
 
j 1X
i=1
pi
!
for j = 2; ::::Ki
where
PRELEC-I : w (p) = e( (  ln(p))
1) : 0 < 1 < 2 (5)
K&T : w (p) =
p2
p2 + (1  p)2
 1
2
: 0:27 < 2 < 1
LINEAR : w (p) = p
POWER : p4 : 0 < 4 < 2
PRELEC-II : e( 5(  ln(p))
6) : 0 < 5 < 2; 0 < 6 < 2
G&E :
8p
7
8p
7 + (1  p)7
 : 0 < 7 < 2; 0 < 8 < 2
The LINEAR probability form is included in our analysis because of its signicance in terms of
corresponding to the EUT model. We wish to assess its performance relative to the other models
that have proven popular in the literature.
Our K&T specication could have an extended parameter space, but its lower bound ensures
that the weight is monotonically increasing in p (Ingersoll, 2008) and the upper bound imposes the
inverse-S (IS) behavior restriction (with linearity at the edge of parameter space). We imposed this
restriction so we can specically investigate a w-form with the IS condition imposed. This type
of transformation was supported by and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), as being the predominant
form of behaviour, but has been challenged by others (e.g. Birnbaum and Chavez, 1997, Harrison et
al., 2010) who provide evidence of S-shaped behaviour. A comprehensive overview of the empirical
evidence supporting IS probability weighting is provided by Wakker (2010).
The IS condition is not imposed on the other w-forms (e.g., PRELEC-I, II, G&E5 and POWER),
although the former two can be either IS or S-shaped. The lower bounds for these forms are required
5We take this nomenclature from Stott (2006). G&E is an abbreviation of Goldstein and Einhom (1987).
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so that the weights are monotonically increasing in probability, and upper bounds for these forms
are not particularly restrictive in the sense that they allow for a wide variety of behaviour, but are
still useful in ensuring that our estimates are convergent.
2.1.3. Inner and Outer Links
The purpose of the links are to determine the probability that one prospect (gi) will be preferred
to another (gj). We also adopt this approach, but explore some alternative specications. The
literature generally only refers to having one link (or choice) function, but we consider it useful
to think of it as being a composite function composed of an Inner and Outer link. The link
aspects take the signal determined by the v-form and w-form aspects to yield a probability that
an individual will choose a given prospect.6
Given common forms of (v,w) these may be combined in various ways to enter the link in
di¤erent ways. Therefore, (v; w; gi; gj) combine to give, ui = hv;w (gi) and uj = hv;w (gj), which
we shall term the utilitiesof the prospects (as distinct from the values or utilitiesof the payo¤s
within the prospects). If one adopts a particular PROBIT or LOGIT link form, there is still a
choice as to how to combine the utilities within the Outer Links. Thus, the link is a composite
function,  (v; w; gi; gj) = 

~ (ui; uj)

, composed of the Inner Link (~) and Outer Link ().
2.1.3.1. Inner Link Forms

~-forms

The majority of studies to date have used the di¤erence between utilities as the Inner Link (i.e.
~ (ui; uj) = ui uj). We investigate this approach as well as.the di¤erence in certainty equivalents
and the contextual utilityapproach of Wilcox (2011). Wilcox introduced the contextual utility
approach for a number of reasons. First, is the observation that a¢ ne transformations of the
same Value form do not necessarily lead to the same utility di¤erences. Second, utility di¤erences
are not monotonically related to the degree of risk aversion perhaps casting doubt on how well a
given model will be identied. Third, if one seeks a stochastic generalisation of the idea that one
individual is more risk averse than another, then utility di¤erences do not lead to such a denition,
whereas under the conditions outlined in Wilcox (2011) such a denition can be obtained, though
this denition requires individuals to have the same w-forms and parameters. Wilcox (2011)
provides further evidence that the contextual approach is superior to the di¤erence in utilities, but
we are not aware that there has been any study that has compared it to the di¤erence in certainty
6In the case of PT v and w take di¤erent forms in the gain and loss domains (and more generally may be
asymmetric around a given reference point). In this study we only consider the gain domain.
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equivalents also.
We dene the Inner Link to be a latent variable representing one of three quantities where each
is calculated as:
 UTILITY: u = ui   uj are the di¤erences in utility across the two prospects
 C-UTILITY: c = (ui   uj)' 1ij where 'ij = v (xupper;ij) v (xlower;ij) and xupper;ij and xlower;ij
are the highest and lowest payo¤s over prospects i and j
 C-EQUIV: e = ei   ej are the di¤erences in certainty equivalents where ei = v 1 (ui) and
ej = v
 1 (uj)
2.1.3.2. Outer Link Forms
 
-forms

If we take y = 1 as the indicator function that an individual selects the prospect with the
higher UTILITY, C-UTILITY, or C-EQUIV, then the Outer Link is a function F (y = 1j ;) =
Pr (y = 1j ;) which can take several forms.
LOGIT : F (y = 1j 1;) =

e 1
1 + e 1

:  1  0 (6)
PROBIT : F (y = 1j 2;) = 1  ( 2) :  2  0 where  is a standard normal cdf
CONSTANT : F (y = 1j 3;) =  3 if  > 0 and 1   3 if   0 where 0:5   3  1
BETA-I + (BETA-II) : F (y = 1j 4;) = 1  Cbeta
 
y = 1j 4;; u; l

(where Cbeta is a cumulative beta distribution)
The LOGIT, PROBIT and CONSTANT -forms have been commonly used as stochastic links
in the literature, but the BETA link has not been investigated, at least in the way that is being
used within this paper. The BETA link has two forms with BETA-II being a generalisation of
BETA-I. The motivation for these two Outer Links is derived from the fact that the utilities from
gambles can, under one rationalisation, be viewed as bounded from above and below. But, being
bounded need not matter depending on interpretation. For example, in a pure tremblessetting,
the individual may nearly always report their non-stochastic preference, except for occasions where
they lapse. However, if one views the choices as arising from a subjective distribution of utilities
or certainty equivalents, then the subjective distributions of these are bounded by the upper and
lower levels in the prospects.
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2.2. The Priority Heuristic
The PH can be described as follows. A respondent compares the lowest payo¤s between two
prospects. If the di¤erence between these is greater than (('1  100)%) of the highest payo¤ over
the two prospects, they choose the one with the highest minimum payo¤. Otherwise, they compare
the probabilities of the two lowest payo¤s. If the higher of these probabilities is '2 more than the
lower, they choose the prospect with the lower probability. Otherwise, they compare the highest
payo¤s between the two prospects and choose the one with the higher payo¤. If they have not
made a decision, they choose randomly. The choice of '1 and '2 in Brandstätter et al. (2006) was
'1 = 0:1 (i.e.10%) and '2 = 0:1: These thresholds were set on the basis of what respondents were
used to dealing with in a decimal system.
The PH is typically employed in a deterministic setting. However, it can also be used in a
stochastic setting by estimating the probability p that the choice indicated by the PH is chosen
by the individual (p > 0:5). That is, it has a constant probability link as outlined above. Once
this has been assigned then the likelihood function for the individual is dened. Additionally, the
thresholds used in the standard PH, '1 and '2, can be treated as estimable parameters.
As well as o¤ering a number of criticisms of the PH, Andersen et al. (2010) argue that such
an approach is ad hoc and that restrictions would need to be placed on the model to allow
estimation of the likelihood. However, we found no problems in estimation providing bounds are
set relatively narrow for the parameters, which nonetheless represented a considerably more exible
parameterisation than the non-stochastic version.
In this paper, we implement three versions of the PH model. The rst (PH-0) is with the
thresholds '1 and '2 being set exogenously at 0.1, the second (PH-I) where both are allowed to
vary according to '1 = '2 = ' where ' is estimated, and the third (PH-II) where '1 and '2 are
estimated and not constrained to be equal, thus nesting both PH-0 and PH-I. '1 and/or '2 were
constrained to lie within the interval (0.01 and 0.20) in the generalised models.
2.3. Model Reparameterisations and Prior Distributions
Within the Bayesian approach prior distributions need to be specied for all parameters in
a model. For a model using the marginal likelihood, these priors need to be proper, and to
some extent informative. In general, the prior distributions should have mass in regions in a
way that reects prior knowledge and beliefs. However, since prior knowledge and beliefs di¤er
between people, these priors are usually set in a relatively di¤use way. With relatively di¤use
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priors, the data will quickly dominate the prior, providing the data is itself informative. Here
we parameterise our models by populating them with parameters # with normal priors, where the
parameter of interest () are transformations of # (See Appendix A1).
2.3.1. v-Form Parameter Priors
In setting the priors for the v-form parameters, we need to emphasise the way in which the
parameter changes the curvature of the v-form. Simply imposing equal prior probability values
for the parameters could lead to priors giving high weight to regions that we consider unlikely.
Therefore, before considering the priors for each of the v-forms it is useful to examine the Pratt
risk coe¢ cient (henceforth pc) (See Appendix A2).
Recalling we normalise x so that it lies within the unit interval, then based on the pc, then
curvature at any given point is related to the various coe¢ cients in equation [2] in very di¤erent
ways. For example, since the utility forms must be monotonically increasing functions in x, which
follows from the various constraints we impose on i; then for the POWER-I form, pc is bounded
from above (at 1
x
) but not from below.
The greatest curvature for any given value of 2 is found for low values of x, but must be less
than one at the largest value of x (x = 1). The LOG form has a pc that is bounded between 0 and
1
x
; thus, it shares the same upper limit as the POWER-I form, whereas the EXPO-I form pc does
not vary with x. The QUAD on the other hand has a lower bound at  1
1+x
and and upper bound
1
1 x : Thus, it has the greatest convexity at low levels of x, but the highest possible concavity at
the upper end of x.
With regard to the parameters 1; 2; and 3 each of these are bounded by zero but have no
upper limit. For these parameters, we set the prior distributions with the majority of the mass
over regions that we consider plausible, but are relatively di¤use so as not to dominate the inuence
of the data. In doing so, we set an upper and lower bound for which a specied percentage of the
mass that lies above and below these values. The parameters 2 and 3 are positively related to
concavity, while 1 is negatively related to concavity. However, with log-normal priors, we can
just as easily think in terms of the reciprocals of 2 and 3 since these are also log-normal. That
is, in setting the distributions for 2 and 3 we can immediately deduce the distributions of their
reciprocals or vice versa.
The POWER-I form o¤ers a useful starting point because previous studies can be used to infer
a prior distribution for 1 without reference to the scaling of x. Generally, previous studies have
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commonly found values of 1 (See Stott (2006), Table 5) as low as 0:225 and as high as 0:89.
However, these are aggregate estimates, whereas for individuals there is likely to be a greater
degree of variability. At the individual level there must be scope for some individuals to display
convexity. Therefore, we set our prior to have Pr (1 < 0:1) = :10 and Pr (1 < 2) = :90: This
equates to having 75% of the prior mass in the concave region. Thus, the POWER-I form displays
signicant concavity, but only at relatively low values of at x (e.g. 1 = 0:1, x = 0:1 has pc = 9).
This distribution also has relatively cumulative high density at points close to zero (representing
approximate risk neutrality).7
The prior for EXPO-I requires concavity like the POWER-I form at lower values of x. Thus,
the distribution for 2 needed to be more di¤use than for 1. On the other hand, no nite level
of variance for 2 can make it as concave for su¢ ciently small values of x. Thus, we set the prior
distribution to have Pr (2 < 0:1) = :10 and Pr (2 < 10) = :90:
For the QUAD, the parameters must lie between the boundaries -1 and 1 with coe¢ cients having
a lower bound at  1
1+x
and and upper bound 1
1 x : Thus, it has greatest convexity at low levels of
x, but the highest possible concavity at the upper end of x. The prior we adopted here assigned
75% mass on the concave region with an approximately linearly decreasing mass as we move from
concavity to convexity.
For the two parameter v-forms (POWER-II and EXPO-II) the same priors were adopted for
5 and 7 as for 2 and 3 respectively. Then, for 6; we note that the POWER-II form increase
in curvature decreases rapidly, particularly at lower levels of x. Therefore, for 6; we specied a
log-normal with 50% of the mass below 0.5 and and 10% of the mass above 1. For the EXPO-II
form the parameter 8 was specied a bounded prior between 0.5 and 1.5 but with the highest
density at 1.
2.3.2. w-Form Parameter Priors
All parameters for the w-forms were parameterised using the bounded transformation being set
to conform to the inequalities presented in Appendix A1. The mean and variance were set so that
the implied priors were for the transformed normals and were approximately uniform.
2.3.3. -Form Parameter Priors
7For the LOG and EXPO-I functions if the parameters to be equal (2 = 3) and to achieve the same level of
concavity (if 2 < 1x ) 3 needs to be higher. In e¤ect, the prior for 3 should be more di¤use with a higher mean
unless the aim was to construct a prior supporting risk neutrality. However, we see that for values of 3 equal to
100 has a value at r that exceeds 99% of its possible value whereas at 10 it is at least 90% of its possible value.
We therefore placed 1% of the mass above 100 and 10% below 0:1. Resulting in a relatively small shift in the mass
above 10, at 13% rather than the 10% for EXPO-I function.
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For the -form priors, the parameters  i (i = 1; 2) were given log-normal priors so that 0.01
percent of the prior mass was below 0.0001 and 99% of the prior mass was below 100. The prior for
 4;1 was also set in this manner and  4;2 was specied to be approximately uniform on the interval
(0,1) and for the constant probability, the prior was set so that it was uniform between 0.5 and 1.8
3. Bayesian Model Comparison and Model Estimation
3.1. What do we mean by the word "Model"?
In this paper, the word modelrefers to the quadriplet mr =

vr; wr; ~r; r

(where vr 2 V ,
wr 2 W and ~r 2 ~; r 2 ) unless it is the PH (of which there are three variants) and where r
is a specic model. Therefore, models are indexed by r with the set of all models being contained
in the set R = (1; :::::;#R): However, the model spaces may be limited to subsets of R which
we call R; which contain #R elements. Therefore, a model is dened when it is populated by a
set of aspect forms, but where the parameters need not be set. For each model, there is a set of
parameters specic to the model with di¤erent parameter supports. We shall denote the collection
of all these parameters for a given model as the vector r (or n;r where applied to individual n)
where each model generates a parameter support r. The probability of choosing one prospect
relative to another is dependent on the pair (mr; r) : The term modelcan be ambiguous, since
it can sometimes be used to refer to mr alone, and sometimes to the pair (mr; r) : Here we refer
to mr as the model, since it is useful to be able to say that two individuals have the same model
even though they may di¤er in their parameters.
3.2. Marginal Likelihoods, Bayes Ratios and Model Probabilities
The Marginal Likelihood (ML) is a distinctly Bayesian quantity, the calculation of which pro-
vides the basis for model comparison (through Bayes Ratios) and model averaging. The calculation
of the ML is common practice in Bayesian econometrics, with a considerable literature devoted to
its calculation and use. However, as the purpose of this paper is not to introduce unfamiliar read-
ers to this approach, we relegate a fuller discussion of the construction of the MLs and associated
statistics to Appendix A3.
In general, MLs can be dened at Levels 0, 1 and 2, and can be constructed to compare singular
models or classes of models. In our model comparisons, we calculate and employ the quantities
8Some expost sensitivity analysis was performed on these priors. For example, the two parameter probability
weigthings were re-estimated by doubling and halving the prior variances. These had no substantive impact on the
results herein.
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lj (N ; R) which represents the logged Marginal Likelihood (LML) for all individuals (N ) for a given
model space R at Level j(j = 0; 1; 2). Within the paper the set R will usually be a model class
dened by a particular aspect form (the model class is, therefore, a limited subset of R called R).
For example, RA could refer to all the models with the POWER-I v-form and RB the set of models
with the QUADRATIC v-form. Alternatively, RA and RB can be dened by the absence of these
forms. A comparison of lj (N ; RA) with lj (N ; RB) enables a comparison between these two sets
of models (with the larger being preferred) where there has been averaging over the other model
aspects (w-forms and links). For example, we can make a determination about how the POWER-I
v-form compares to the QUADRATIC v-form, which is not conditional on a specic w-form or link.
The Bayes Ratio supporting RA over RB at level j is exp (lj (N ; RA)  lj (N ; RB)) So, for
example, a Bayes Ratio of 10 would, under uniform model priors, indicate that the model space
with the higher LML was relatively 10 times as likely compared to the model with the lesser LML.
In our empirical section, we report Logged Bayes Ratios (LBR) since the raw Bayes Ratios can
be very large. The reported LBRs are the di¤erence between the LML where a given aspect form
has either been solely included or excluded and the LML is where all combinations of aspect forms
are allowed (the unrestricted model spaceMR).
We also calculate and present the individuals model probabilities (n;R): These can be in-
terpreted as the probability that a model class R should be applied to an individual n; and we
present n;R in the form of histograms for key model classes. These probabilities are also used to
produce model averaged estimates of "quantities of interests" such as ; which we use to estimate
an individuals probability for the w-form.
3.3. Model Estimation
Adaptive Monte Carlo Markov Chains (MCMC) (see Andrieu and Johannes 2008) were used
to estimate all models. This followed from an investigation of a subset of models estimated on
a subset of individuals, which initially used a random walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm (e.g.
see Koop 2003). While this algorithm converged quickly for most model-individual combinations,
the mixing of the sampler was slow for a small proportion of models. While the parameters of
interest are non-normal, each of the parameters is expressed as a function of a parameter with a
normal prior, which suggested that a multivariate normal proposal density would be an appropriate
choice for an MCMC independence chain. Investigation of the output from the random walk
samplers also conrmed that the posterior distributions (for the untransformed parameters) could
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be approximated by normals. Therefore, our approach to estimation used an initial phase to
nding proposal densities, followed by another to estimate the parameters (See.Appendix A4 for
details).
3.4. Model Comparison Strategy
Our approach to model comparison takes account of the three di¤erent levels of heterogeneity
(j = 0; 1; 2) discussed in the Introduction. The results reported in Table 1 and 2 are LBR for
the model sets dened by the sole inclusion (in Table 1) or exclusion (in Table 2) of a given
aspect form at Levels 0, 1 and 2. Sole inclusion means that all forms within a given aspect have
been excluded from the model space other than the one listed in the label column. Exclusion
means that a particular aspect form is no longer part of the model space. We have taken this
approach to model comparison as the sole inclusion and exclusion comparisons address slightly
di¤erent questions in relation to model comparison:
 The inclusion approach asks whether a particular aspect form can adequately replace all the
forms within that aspect; and,
 The exclusion approach asks whether a particular aspect form can be replaced by the collection
of other forms within the aspect.
As part of the model comparison exercise we report the LML values for the unrestricted model
space (MR) for each heterogeneity level at the bottom of Tables 1 and 2. These estimates are
l0 (N;R) =  4206:09, l1 (N;R) =  3531:26 and l2 (N;R) =  3633:92, and they can be used in
conjunction with the LBRs within the Tables (at the same respective levels) to obtain the "top" or
"best" model LMLs for eachMR dened by the inclusion or exclusion of an aspect form. Notably,
the models with the highest LML at Levels 0 and 1 would be the same as if we were to assemble
models by choosing each of the highest performing aspect forms based on their model averaged
LMLs.9
So for example, if we consider Level 0 in Table 1, and then we take the LBR for the best aspect
forms, add the LBRs together and then take this value away from l0 (N;R) we arrive at the estimate
of the LML for the "Top Model". Thus, a positive LBR in Table 1 means that by imposing a
9We note, that while this makes complete sense, it is not a formal requirement that the two should equate. A
particular aspect form could perform well when averaged across the other aspect forms, yet not actually be part of
the model with the very highest LML.
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particular aspect form on all individuals has resulted in an improvement of the performance of the
model space relative to the unrestricted model spaceMR. In contrast, a negative LBR in Table 2
indicates that the exclusion of this model aspect reduces the explanatory power of the model space.
However, one important di¤erence in terms of model comparison is that the PH specication is a
separate model and it is not combined with other aspects. Also, for the PH specications there
is no distinction between Level 1 and Level 2 for sole inclusionin Table 1, although there is a
distinction between Levels 1 and 2 for exclusion in Table 2.
Although not a formal requirement, at Levels 0 and 1, we would generally expect a positive
LBR in Table 1 to be associated with a negative LBR in Table 2. However, for Level 2, this is
not necessarily to be expected. For example, a particular aspect form may do well in explaining
a subset of individuals, yet do badly when applied to everybody. In this case we might obtain a
negative LBR in Table 2 and positive LBR in Table 1 associated with this aspect form. Indeed,
it can be observed within Table 2, that the LBRs for a number of aspect forms are the same for
Levels 0 and 1. This is because these aspects are associated with models with very low LMLs.
However, since the model space continues to include the highly performing models, the reduction
in the LML is ostensibly due to the relatively small penalty incurred by increasing the dimension
of the model space from a large dimension to an even larger one.
4. Results
4.1.1. The Representative Agent (LEVEL 0)
We see from Tables 1 and 2, that at Level 0, the worst performing specication (given the
most negative values in Table 1, and slight positive value in Table 2) is the PH, although the most
general specication (PH-II) does improve model performance with estimates for the thresholds
of fE ('1) ; stdv ('1)g = f0:0392; 0:00496g and fE ('2) ; stdv ('2)g = f0:1470:0139g. The TAX w-
form is the worst performing model within the compensatory class. Interestingly, the second best
w-form is the POWER w-form, even though ultimately it is not supported in terms of inclusion
or exclusion in Tables 1 and 2. This nding is also reected by the plot of the w-form for
the top performing Level 0 specication, the PRELEC-II, which is presented in Figure 1 For
the PRELEC-II the resulting parameter estimates are fE (5) ; stdv (5)g = f0:629; 0:055g and
fE (6) ; stdv (6)g = f0:829; 0:026g).10
10Stott (2006) reports values of exactly 1 for both parameters of the PRELEC-II which is actually Linear, even
though the PRELEC-I estimate is not linear. This seems unlikely, though is technically possible as the estimates
are derived as medians of individuals, rather than using the representative agent model we are reporting here.
18
{Approximate Position of Figure 1}
Interestingly, the shape of this w-form shown in Figure 1 is not really of the classic IS shaped
form favoured in the literature, but more of a concave function over the entire range. Therefore, our
representative agent is estimated to be risk averse in the sense of having a concave v, but counter
to this, w overweights low probability large payo¤s, though is rather optimistic with respect to high
payo¤s with high probability also.11
Overall the best combination of aspects incorporates a POWER-I v-form12 and PRELEC-II
w-form, a LOGIT -form and C-UTILITY -form (its LML is reported at the bottom of Tables
1). This conclusion is reached since the sole inclusion of each of these aspect forms is supported in
Table 1, and their exclusion is unsupported in Table 2. The LBRs for each of these aspect forms
in Table 1, while positive, are moderate or small. The LBRs in Table 2 are somewhat larger in
absolute terms. At Level 0 there is only one positive LBR within each aspect in terms of inclusion
and only one negative value for the same aspect forms in terms of exclusion.
{Approximate Position of Tables 1 and 2}
4.1.2. Parameter Heterogeneity - Model Homogeneity (LEVEL 1)
Next we consider the heterogeneous parameter specications (Level 1) with results again re-
ported in Tables 1 and 2. With a Level 1 specication all respondents are endowed with a common
model, but allowed to have di¤erent parameters.
Dealing rst with the PH model, our Table 2 results show that there is not much to be lost or
gained by including the PH within the model space with LBRs close to zero at Level 1. However,
as we can see in Table 1, the sole inclusion of the PH is clearly outperformed by any of the
compensatory models given the very negative values relative to the other LBRs for the compensatory
models. The generalisations of the PH, allowing it to have estimated thresholds, signicantly
improves its relative performance, nonetheless, even with these generalisations there is no basis for
arguing that these PH specications outperform the compensatory models, at least in this context.
As with Level 0, at Level 1 within each aspect there is only one form with a positive LBR in
Table 1 for each of the non-PH models, and a negative LBR in Table 2. Thus, the choice of highest
11We note the observation of Wakker (2010) page 228 about the stability of probability weighting compared to
utility curvature.
12Although not explicitly reported the estimated parameter value is E (1) = 0:197 with a standard deviation of
0:013: This results indicates a strongly concave form, which is consistent with Stott (2006) who reports 0:19:
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performing aspects forms is unambiguous. As in the Level 0 case, starting with the v-form aspect,
we see that the POWER-I v-form is a clear winner with the highest LBR in Table 1 and a negative
LBR in Table 2. It is larger than the alternative forms by a considerable margin. It is then
followed by the LOG, and EXPO-II in Table 1, though neither are supported by having positive
LBRs in Table 1 or negative in Table 2.
Turning to the w-form aspect, the two top performing w-forms are the more general ones
(PRELEC-II and G&E) with the G&E being the best performing followed by the PRELEC- II
since it is the only one with a positive LBR in Table 1 and a negative LBR in Table 2. As with
Level 0, the worst performing w-form in Table 1 is the TAX model. These results are inconsistent
with Stott (2006), who concluded that the PRELEC-I is the better w-form. However, Stott (2006)
arrives at this conclusion by arguing that, after elimination of other poorly performing aspects, the
PRELEC-I performs the best, even though in general the two parameter forms (PRELEC-II and
G&E based on rankings and averages of AICs) are the top ranked forms if there is no elimination
of poorly performing aspect forms.
With respect to the ~-form it is evident, as at Level 0, that the C-UTILITY ~-form outper-
forms both the UTILITY and the C-EQUIV. This result further supports the idea that contextual
utility has both empirical support as well as theoretical motivation. However, we note that the
di¤erence between C-UTILITY and UTILITY is relatively small, whereas the C-EQUIV model
does considerably worse than both these other forms.
With regard to the -form, the BETA-II -form outperforms the other -forms, with the next
preferred being the BETA-I. Our results suggest that the PROBIT outperforms the LOGIT spec-
ication, a nding that again does not completely accord with that of Stott (2006). The best
performing links have changed as a result of moving from Level 0 to Level 1. If we were to give
this a structural interpretation, it would be that the treatment of the -form in terms of individuals
forming a subjective distribution of outcomes which takes account of the bounded nature of that
distribution is supported. However, the way that people construct that distribution di¤ers across
individuals. The poor performance of the CONSTANT -form is noteworthy as the worst link to
be imposed on all models.
4.1.3 Heterogeneity in Parameters and Models (LEVEL 2)
We now consider our Level 2 results. In this case, in addition to the results in Tables 1 and 2,
we report a "best-worst" analysis in Table 3.
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{Approximate Position of Table 3}
Table 3 reports for each model aspect the number of times a particular form occurs as the
top model over all individuals. Particular care needs to be taken in interpreting the numbers
in Table 3, and should not be used as an accurate guide to the overall performance of a given
specication. In addition to Table 3, we also present Figure 3 that illustrates model probabilities
by individuals by general model class: the PH; TAX; the Linear Probability w-form; and the Non-
Linear PT w-forms. In Figure 2 these model probabilities have been calculated using a "uniform"
0.5 prior probability on the models within that class and a collective 0.5 prior probability on all
other models of a di¤erent class, where all models within the classes are considered equally likely.
This represents a change in model priors for each case, so there is no reason for model probabilities
across model classes to add to one across individuals. Therefore, Figures 3 illustrates the revision
of the probability distributed across individuals after observation of the data, when one starts from
the position that they are equally likely to come from a particular model class and the class of all
other models.
Dealing rst with the PH, we have already established that the sole inclusion of the PH performs
very poorly at Level 1 or 2. From the top part of Table 3, we can see that for ve of these individuals
the PH-II is in fact the top performing model and that these individuals have very high posterior
probabilities of being PH types. These results highlight the fact while as a model of collective
behaviour (as discussed in the preceding section) the PH is a poor performer, the PH-II is a good
candidate model for small a number of individuals, which was being reected in the positive LBR
in Table 2. .Turning to Figure 2, we can also see that very low model probabilities are assigned
to the collective PH models, with 75% or so of individuals having near zero weight assigned to the
PH model class, with the remainder being given non-negligible weight. Importantly, however, this
does not mean that the PH model did not perform well for some individuals.
{Approximate Position of Figure 2}
If now consider the compensatory specications at the Level 2, results in Tables 1 and 2 are
di¤erent from Levels 0 and 1 in that there are several forms within some of the aspects that are
supported. First, the POWER-I v-form enjoys the most support in terms of both inclusion and
exclusion. This support is also reected in the high number of individuals who consider POWER-I
the best v-form. We also note, that the LOG v-form also has positive LBRs in both Tables 1 and
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2 and clear support in Table 3. Likewise, both the PRELEC-II and G&E w-forms are supported
by positive LBRs in Table 1 and negative LBRs in Table 2. However, the removal of the POWER
and PRELEC-I w-forms are marginally not supported given their negative values. For the Inner
Links both the UTILITY AND C-UTILITY ~-forms are both supported as being components of
the best performing model space, as both have positive values in Table 1and negative in Table 2.
The results in Table 1 with regard to the Outer Link also suggest that one -form can adequately
substituted for the others, though the BETA links do best. In Table 2 we observe that the removal
of either BETA -form reduces the performance of the model space, and of note is the fact that
unlike Levels 0 and 1, the removal of the CONSTANT -form is not supported in Table 2. What
this suggests is that while the CONSTANT -form is a very poor form to ascribe to everybody
(given its large negative value in Table 1), it does very well at describing some individuals (given
its large negative value in Table 2). Also the last panel of Figure 2 contains the collective model
probabilities for the non-linear (or rather potentially non-linear) variants of PT. As can be seen
this class of model has considerably more support than the others, but notably, very little support
for a few individuals and one individual in particular.
Turning to the TAX model even though its removal was supported within Table 2, an examina-
tion of Table 3 indicates that the TAX model is also the top model for 5 individuals. This nding
is also observed in Figure 2 with around 50% of individuals with very small posterior probabilities,
with only 15 individuals having prior mass above 50%. Thus, the TAX model remains a good
candidate model for a small number of individuals, though as a characterisation of behaviour for
all or most individuals it is poor as noted discussed in the previous section.
Finally, if we consider the LINEAR w-form we observe little support in Tables 1 and 2 but
interestingly this is the top model for 20 individuals as reported in Table 3. Notably, however, it
is also in the worst for specication for 68 people. Similarly, in Figure 2 there are a considerable
number of individuals that have relatively large prior probabilities of being LINEAR for the w-
form. However, a minority of individuals (36) have more than 50% posterior probability of being
LINEAR. So again, there is evidence that for a minority of individuals that the LINEAR w-form
remains a good candidate model, but this is certainly not true for the majority.
4.2. Overall Model Comparison
The rst nding to note is that there has been a large fall in the LML values for all aspect forms
as a result of imposing the representative agent restriction (Level 0) relative to either Levels 1 or 2
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(that is comparing l0 (N;R) ; l1 (N;R) and l2 (N;R)). If we were to treat the representative agent
model as a hypothesis, we would reject this restriction in complete condence, in favour of agents
having di¤erent parameters, even if they have the same models (combination of aspect forms)
imposed upon them. Both l1 (N;R) and l2 (N;R) exceed  4199:74, which is the top performing
Level 0 model. Thus, while the notion of a representative agent may be an attractive assumption,
such a construction disguises the true heterogeneous nature of risk attitudes across individuals, at
least for this data set.
Another important observation is that, as l1 (N;R) exceeds l2 (N;R), this in a sense supports
the common model restriction (R) as specied by the set of aspect forms above. However, by
narrowing the model space to a subset of well performing aspect forms one can achieve LML values
that exceed the top performing Level 1 model. In order to explore this further, we conducted a
search13 over model spaces. Our results indicate that the top model space (at Level 2) contained
the POWER-I, + (PRELEC-II and G&E) + (CONSTANT and BETA I and BETA-II) + (C-
UTILITY) aspect forms, with a Level 2 LML equal to  3518:49: This exceeds the top Level 1
model LML ( 3524:84). The subtraction or replacement of any aspect form (or PH model) reduces
the LML at Level 2. Therefore, although at Level 2 in the full model space there is evidence that
removal of the POWER w-form, and the UTILITY Inner Link reduced performance, when seeking
an optimal combination of forms they played no part. Thus, this result further supports the
C-UTILITY ~-form as the optimal choice even at Level 2.
Overall, these results support the contention that no single w-form or -form was su¢ ciently
exible to adequately model all individual behaviour. As discussed above, overall non-linear w-
forms, other than the TAX model, do better at explaining the majority of individual behaviour.
However, the nature of the non-linearity has not been broadly discussed in the literature. This
issue is explored in Figure 3.
{Approximate Position of Figure 3}
Figure 3 gives the estimates by individual for the ve non-linear PT w-forms, along with the
model averaged estimates over all of the six in the top left hand corner (averaging uses [20]). Each
plot has curves for all individuals though it may appear as shading. As can be seen the model
13Our search was not over the entire model space. We started by including all aspect forms for which elimination
was not supported in Table 2. The search was then over all model spaces in which there was an elimination of one
or more of these aspect forms.
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averaged version take some of the attributes of each of the components. What is also clear from
both the averaged and two parameter w-forms is that there are individuals which appear to be
mainly concave, mainly convex, IS or S-shaped.
Individuals were also grouped into whether they had an S or IS shape or were (almost) purely
concave or convex. What we can see is that there is a mix of individuals. Five individuals are
concave (so purely "optimistic"), but with a larger number of individuals being convex (so purely
"pessimistic), but with the remainder being fairy evenly split between being S or IS shaped. This
paints quite a di¤erent picture from that of the representative agent model (Level 0). Therefore,
the combined choices of individuals are best modelled by a primarily concave w-form, but an
examination of all individual level results in no way supports the contention that most people
behave in this way.
Finally, it is worth noting that we have found this degree of heterogeneity in spite of the limited
prospect employed to generate the data examined. This of course does not imply that a di¤erent
prospect would yield similar results, but it does suggest that more attention needs to be given to
potential heterogeneity present in such data.
5. Conclusions
This paper has reexamined models of choice under risk using a Bayesian approach to estimation
and model selection. We compared a large range of model specications including PT models, the
TAX model of Birnbaum and Chavez (1997) and a generalisation of the PH of Brandstätter et al.
(2006) for which the thresholds were estimated. In addition, all models have been examined at
di¤erent levels of heterogeneity so that model performance can be assessed in relation to aggregate
as well as individual behaviour.
In terms of the v-form aspect (value functions), our results are in general accordance with the
ndings of Stott (2006). The one parameter POWER-I was far superior to the other forms con-
sidered, whether it was applied at the representative agent level (Level 0) or at the individual level
(Level 2). In addition, our results support the use of non-linear w-form as suggested by PT, but this
conclusion comes with some caveats. Whereas Stott (2006) preferred the one parameter PRELEC-
I specication, we found that the two parameter w-forms were superior, and our ndings were
di¤erent depending on the level of heterogeneity that was permitted. For the representative agent
(Level 0) the two parameter PRELEC-II was preferred, whereas with heterogeneity in parameter
values (Level 1) the G&E specication was generally preferred to the PRELEC-II. However, where
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heterogeneity in both forms and parameters was permitted (Level 2), neither of the generalised
forms alone seemed su¢ cient to explain the behaviour of all individuals. This was also reected
in the fact that individuals seemed to have a great degree of heterogeneity with respect to w-form
(i.e., probability weightings).
Overall, at the representative agent level (Level 0), there appeared to the familiar overweighting
of small probability high payo¤s, but of a more concave form than the IS form than commonly
assumed within the literature. While all or nearly all individuals appeared to have concave v-form
(value functions), the individual w-form (probability weightings) were commonly of IS, S, concave
or convex functions, consistent with the observation of Wakker (2010, p.228) that "In general,
probability weighting is a less stable component than outcome utility". In behavioural terms what
this means is that there are individuals that behave in a pure pessimistic way, pure optimistic
way, as well as having the kind of reversal in probability weightings dictated by the S or IS forms.
This also means that researchers should be careful in the implementation of the IS approach, as
recommended by Kahnmann and Tversky (1992). Researchers should not automatically jump
to the conclusion that a form that ostensibly facilitates IS behaviour should be imposed on all
individuals.
Across the di¤erent levels of heterogeneity, the contextual utility approach introduced byWilcox
(2011) was found to have the most support relative to the utility di¤erence or the certainty equiv-
alent di¤erence approaches. The certainty equivalent approach was signicantly inferior to the
other two. While the contextual utility approach was supported empirically, some of the theoreti-
cal motivation for the contextual utility approach is weakened by the fact that individuals have a
wide range of probability weightings meaning that the categorisation of somebody being more or
less stochastically risk averse relative to others will prove impossible.
More generally, the results herein also remind us that for all the classes of models investigated
here, no one model could adequately predict everybody, and the collective set of models failed
to predict the behaviour of all individuals. It is, of course, possible that such a framework that
can explain all behaviour simply does not exist and individuals employ di¤erent strategies when
making choices under risk. Indeed, we found little support for either the TAX or PH model
being applied to all individuals, though these models outperformed others for a small number of
individuals. Furthermore, our generalisations of the PH approach improved its performance, but
not su¢ ciently for it to outperform compensatory approaches.
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This paper also introduced a BETA Outer Link which was found to outperform those com-
monly employed in the literature such as the LOGIT, PROBIT or CONSTANT probability link
when applied at the individual level, though the LOGIT was preferred at the representative agent
level. Notably, the CONSTANT probability Outer Link performed poorly relative to a others if
applied to everybody, but seemed a good descriptor for some individuals. Therefore, in line with
our expectations, deterministic compensatory models were more likely to predict choices if there
were large di¤erences in utility (contextual utility or certainty equivalents) rather than small ones.
However, some individuals seemed to be performing in a way that was more consistent with the
tremblescharacterisation.
Looking to the future, we would contend that there is room for further empirical studies aimed
specically at examining the nature of risk functionals in the loss and mixed domains, taking a
further look at PT propositions such as convexity of the Value function within the loss domain and
loss aversion. These propositions could be usefully examined under a wide range of specications
using the model averaging approaches employed in this paper, or perhaps employing a reversible
jump approach (e.g. Green, 1995) so that computational burdens of computing thousands of
models can be reduced. Some may take the view that since there are now a number of papers
which estimate preference parameters, this literature is already exhibiting decreasing returns. We
take a di¤erent view. On such a fundamental issue there is a signicant need for further work to
be done.
Indeed, there are a signicant range of estimates in the literature for key preference parameters
that suggest that perhaps behavioural parameters such as those governing probability weightings
may be heavily dependent on the experimental design, or more generally the context in which
decisions are made. If, for example, further studies nd quite di¤erent probability weighting
patterns we would question whether the conditions and environment within which the experiment
are having a signicant role in peoples attitudes towards risk and use of probabilities, which PT
and RDU theories to do not permit.
Finally, we believe that there is benets in taking on board some of the "process based" ap-
proaches used in psychology (e.g. Fiedler and Glockner, 2012) to give a further insight into the
behaviour of individuals, but combining them with econometric analyses of the sort conducted here.
References
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I. and Rutström, E. (2008). Eliciting Risk and Time
26
Preferences. Econometrica, 76(3): 583618.
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I. and Rutström, E. (2010). Behavioral Econometrics
for Psychologists, Journal of Economic Psychology, 31: 553576.
Andrews D.K. (1998). Hypothesis Testing with a restricted parameter space. Journal of
Econometrics, 84:155-199.
Andrieu C. and Thoms J. (2008). A tutorial on adaptive MCMC. Statistical Computation,18:
343373
Barberis, N.C. (2013). Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assess-
ment, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(1): 173-196.
Birnbaum, M. H. (2006). Evidence against prospect theories in gambles with positive, negative,
and mixed consequences. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27: 737761.
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008). Evaluation of the priority heuristic as a descriptive model of risky
decision making: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, Hertwig (2006). Psychological Review,
115(1): 253260.
Birnbaum, M. H. and Chavez, A. (1997). Tests of theories of decision-making: Violations of
branch independence and distribution independence. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 71(2): 161194.
Booij, A.S., van Praag, B.M.S. and van de Kuilen, G. (2010). A Parametric Analysis of Prospect
Theorys Functionals for the General Population, Theory and Decision, 68: 115-148.
Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., and Hertwig, R. (2006). The priority heuristic: Making choices
without trade-o¤s. Psychological Review, 113(2): 409432.
Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G. and Hertwig, R. (2008). Risky Choice with Heuristics Reply to
Birnbaum (2008) Johnson Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Willemsen (2008) and Riger and Wang (2008).
Psychological Review, 115(1): 281-290.
Bruhin, A., Fehr-Duda, H. and Epper, T. (2010). Risk and Rationality: Uncovering Hetero-
geneity in Probability Distortion, Econometrica, 78(4): 1375-1412.
Camerer, C.F. and Ho, T-H. (1994). Violations of the betweenness axiom and nonlinearity in
probability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8: 167196.
Carbone, E. and Hey, J.D. (2000). Which Error Story is Best, Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty 20: 161176.
Conte, A., Hey, J.D. and Mo¤at, J. (2011). Mixture models of choice under risk Journal of
27
Econometrics 162: 7988
Cox, J.C. and Sadiraj, V. (2006). Small- and Large-Stakes Risk Aversion: Implications of
Concavity Calibration for Decision Theory, Games and Economic Behaviour, 56: 45-60.
Cox, J.C., Sadiraj, V., Vogt, B. and Dasgupta, U. (2012). Is There a Plausible Theory for
Decision Under Risk? A Dual Calibration Critique, Economic Theory, (Forthcoming).
Fiedler, S. and Glöckner, A. (2012) The dynamics of decision making in risky choice: an
eye-tracking analysis. Frontiers in Psychology, 3: Article 335.
Fehr-Duda, H. and Epper, T. (2012). Probability and Risk: Foundations and Economic Implica-
tions of Probability-Dependent Risk Preferences, Annual Review of Economics, 4(1): 567-593.
Fernandez, C., Ley, E. and Steel, M.F. (2001). Benchmark priors for Bayesian model averaging.
Journal of Econometrics 100: 381-427.
Findley D.F. (1990) Making di¢ cult model comparisons, Bureau of the Census Statistical
Research Division Report Series, SRD Research Report Number: CENSUS/SRD/RR-90/11.
Gelfand, A. and Dey, D. (1994). Bayesian model choice: asymptotics and exact calculations.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (Series B) 56: 501504.
Green, P.J. (1995) Reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo computation and Bayesian
model determination, Biometrika, 82(4): 711-32.
Goldstein, W. M. and Einhom, H. J. (1987). Expression theory and the preference reversal
phenomena. Psychological Review, 94(2): 236-254.
Harless, D.W. and Camerer, C.F. (1994). The predictive utility of generalized expected utility
theories. Econometrica, 62(6): 12511289.
Harrison, G.W., Humphrey, S.J. and Verschoor, A. (2010). Choice Under Uncertainty: Evidence
from Ethiopia, India and Uganda, Economic Journal, 120: 80-104.
Harrison, G.W. and Rutström, E. (2009). Expected utility and prospect theory: One wedding
and a decent funeral. Experimental Economics, 12(2): 133158.
Hey, J. D., and Orme, C. (1994). Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using
experimental data. Econometrica, 62(6): 12911326.
Ingersoll, J. (2008), Non-Monotonicity of the Tversky-Kahneman Probability-Weighting Func-
tion: A Cautionary Note, European Financial Management, 14(3): 385390
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47: 263291.
28
Koop G. (2003). Bayesian Econometrics. Wiley: Chichester
Nilsson H., Rieskampa J. and Wagenmakers, E.J.(2011). Hierarchical Bayesian parameter esti-
mation for cumulative prospect theory. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 55: 8493.
Pesaran, M. H. and Weeks, M. (2007) Nonnested Hypothesis Testing: An Overview, inA Com-
panion to Theoretical Econometrics (ed B. H. Baltagi), Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden,
MA, USA.
Prelec, D. (1998). The probability weighting function. Econometrica, 66: 497527.
Quiggin, J. (1982). A Theory of Anticipated Utility. Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization 3: 323343.
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A calibration Theorem, Econo-
metrica, 68: 1281-1292.
Rabin, M. and Thaler, R. H. (2001). Anomalies Risk Aversion Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 15(1): 219-232.
Sala-i-Martin, X., Doppelhofer, G. and Miller, R. (2004). Determinants of Long-Term Growth:
A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach, American Economic Review,
94: 813835.
Shleifer, A. (2012). Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of Daniel Kahnemans Thinking, Fast
and Slow, Journal of Economic Literature, 50(4): 1-12.
Stott , H.P. ( 2006). Cumulative prospect theorys functional menagerie. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 32: 101130
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representa-
tions of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5: 297323.
Vuong, Q.H. (1989). Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses.
Econometrica, 57(2): 307333.
Wakker, P.P. (2010). Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity, Cambridge University
Press.
Wilcox, N.T. (2011) Stochastically more risk averse:A contextual theory of stochastic discrete
choice under risk, Journal of Econometrics, 162: 89104.
29
Table 1: Log Bayes Ratios by Sole Inclusion of Aspect Forms
(Elimination of alternative aspect forms other than that listed)
Pr Heuristic Level 0 Level 1+2
PH-0 -976.49 -1559.71
PH-I -538.14 -882.41
PH-II -502.89 -856.51
Value
(v-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
P-weight
(w-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
POWER-I 1.71 1.80 66.04 TAX -156.27 -399.31 -289.05
EXPO-I -106.33 -142.90 -81.54 LINEAR -11.33 -199.05 -140.65
LOG -0.65 -82.60 5.31 PRELEC-I -7.94 -30.71 -22.34
QUAD -375.02 -445.26 -500.24 K&T -8.34 -162.74 -110.31
POWER-II -22.33 -395.41 -390.41 POWER -5.29 -130.99 -54.15
EXPO-II -91.07 -128.07 -61.60 PRELEC-II 1.95 -5.75 13.61
G&E -9.31 1.95 9.04
Outer Link
(-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
Inner Link
(~-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
LOGIT 1.60 -74.30 -90.65 UTILITY -5.85 -2.93 10.88
PROBIT -8.73 -23.38 -47.49 C-UTILITY 1.10 1.09 13.57
CONSTANT -334.48 -208.73 -144.15 E-EQUIV -77.76 -209.44 -145.74
BETA-I -10.22 -1.73 -2.81
BETA-II -2.78 1.58 -7.86
Notes: Values are di¤erences of the form lj (N;R)  lj (N;R) where j denotes level
l0 (N;R) =  4206:09, l1 (N;R) =  3531:26, l2 (N;R) =  3633:92.
Top Model (Level 0) POWER-I, PRELEC-II, LOGIT,C-UTILITY: -4199.75
Top Model (Level 1): POWER-I,G&E, BETA-II, C-UTILITY: -3524.85
Top Model Space (Level 2) POWER-I, G&E+PRELEC-II,
BETA-I+BETA-II+CONST, C-UTILITY: -3518.49
A Positive LBR supports the inclusion of an aspect form
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Table 2: Log Bayes Ratios Under Exclusion of Aspect Forms
(Elimination of the listed aspect form)
PH Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
PH-0 0.0015 0.0027 0.14
PH-I 0.0015 0.0027 -0.04
PH-II 0.0015 0.0027 -0.23
Value
(v-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
P-weight
(w-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level2
POWER-I -2.27 -84.21 -49.71 TAX 0.15 0.16 5.96
EXPO-I 0.18 0.18 5.62 LINEAR 0.15 0.16 .96
LOG 0.09 0.18 -11.50 PRELEC-I 0.15 0.16 -.98
QUAD 0.18 0.18 13.00 K&T 0.15 0.16 2.56
POWER-II 0.18 0.18 12.05 POWER 0.15 0.16 -2.71
EXPO-II 0.18 0.18 4.33 PRELEC-II -6.96 0.16 -7.19
G&E 0.15 -7.55 -6.79
Outer Link
(-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
Inner Link
(~-form)
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
LOGIT -4.17 0.22 10.48 UTILITY 0.40 0.39 -13.22
PROBIT 0.22 0.22 2.22 C-UTILITY -6.55 -3.62 -11.88
CONSTANT 0.22 0.22 -22.10 E-EQUIV 0.41 0.41 14.26
BETA-I 0.22 0.19 -10.19
BETA-II 0.21 -3.12 -5.62
Values are di¤erences of the form lj (N;R)  lj (N;R) where j denotes level
l0 (N;R) =  4206:09, l1 (N;R) =  3531:26, l2 (N;R) =  3633:92.
A positive LBR supports the exclusion of an aspect form
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Table 3: Occurrences of Best-Worst Performing
Forms over Individual at Level 2
PH Best Worst
PH-0 0 12
PH-I 0 0
PH-II 5 0
Value
(v-form)
Best Worst
P-weight
(w-form)
Best Worst
POWER-I 44 0 TAX 5 0
EXPO-I 1 1 LINEAR 20 68
LOG 31 1 PRELEC-I 8 3
QUAD 5 76 K&T 10 7
POWER-II 3 0 POWER 17 0
EXPO-II 1 0 PRELEC-II 15 0
G&E 10 0
Outer Link
(-form)
Best Worst
Inner Link
(~-form)
Best Worst
LOGIT 2 0 UTILITY 42 7
PROBIT 21 0 C-UTILITY 23 8
CONSTANT 19 21 E-EQUIV 20 63
BETA-I 29 1
BETA-II 14 56
Note: There are 90 individuals in the sample. 85 out 90 are
best described by a compensatory model. Only 5 are best
described by the PH.
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Figure 1: Representative Agent w-form
Function
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Figure 2: Model Probabilities by Main Model Types
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Figure 3: Probability Weighting Function Plots by Individual
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Appendix A1: Transformations
The parameters of interest in the models take  in only one of two forms. That is, we parame-
terise our model by using  = t1 (#; l; u) = l+(u   l) e#1+e# or  = t2 (#) = exp (#) where # 2 R.
In the case of t1 (#; l; u) the transformed parameter lies within the interval (l; u). We set the
values for fig a priori in accordance with the inequality constraints. The priors for parameters of
the form t1 (#; l; u) are (#  N (0; )) where they are assigned a variance  equal to 94 , yielding an
approximately uniform prior within the specied interval, although there is less mass at the very
extremes. Thus, in a sense we are being non-informativeabout the values except that we have
specied the interval over which the parameters lie. For parameters of the form t2 (#) we assume
that # is normally distributed so that the implied prior distribution for the transformed parameter
is log-normal.
Appendix A2: Pratt Coe¢ cients
For the v-forms in the text are as follows:
POWER-I : pc =
(1  1)
x
: 1 > 0
EXPO-I : pc = 2 : 2 > 0
LOG : pc =
3
(1 + 3x)
: 3 > 0
QUAD : pc =
4
1  4x : 4 > 0; 4 <
2
xmax
POWER-II : pc =
(1  5)
6 + x
: 5 > 0; 6 > 0
EXPO-II : pc =
 
(7   1)x 1 + 78x8 1

: 7 > 0; 0:5 < 8 < 1:5
Appendix A3: Marginal Likelihoods and Model Probabilities
Individuals are indexed by n and the collection of all individuals as the set N = (1; :::::N):
Models are indexed by r with the set of all models being contained in the set R = (1; :::::;#R):
However, the model spaces may be limited to subsets of R which we call R; which contain #R
elements. For the representative agent model (Level 0), and collective choices of all individuals as
Y = (y1; :::::yN) where individual n makes choices yn; the marginal likelihood for model mr is the
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prior predictive density of the observed data:
f (Y jmr) =
Z
r2r
f (Y jmr; r) f (rjmr) dr (7)
where f (rjmr) prior distributions of the parameters r and f (Y jmr; r) is the likelihood of the
data. Commonly, it is the log marginal likelihood (LML) that is the reported quantity which we
dene as l0 (N ; r) = ln f (Y jmr) and can be averagedover models in the sense that if a class of
models is dened as MR = fmrgrR where R  R (R being the index set of all models) then:
l0 (N ; R) = ln f (Y jMR) = ln
 X
rR
el(N ;r)f (mrjMR)
!
(8)
where f (mrjMR) is the prior distribution for a given model conditional on MR. If all models
within that class are equally likely, then f (mrjMR) = 1#R . (with #R denoting the number of
elements within R). Therefore:
l0 (N ; R) = ln
 X
r2R
el(N ;r)
#R
!
(9)
At the individual level, the marginal likelihood of a model with respect to an individual is,
f (ynjmr) =
Z
n;r2r
f (ynjmr; n;r) f (n;rjmr) dn;r (10)
Under the assumption that the same parameter priors are assigned to every individual f (n;rjmr) =
f (rjmr) for all n. The LML isl (n; r) = ln f (ynjmr) as at Level 0, the LML at the individual level
can be averagedover models in the sense that if a class of models is dened as MR = fmrgrR
where R  R (R being the index set of all models) then:
l (n;R) = ln f (ynjMR) = ln
 X
rR
el(n;r)f (mrjMR)
!
(11)
and if all models are equally likely within the class ofMR:
l (n;R) = ln
 X
r2R
el(n;r)
#R
!
(12)
Where there are no parameter restrictions across individuals, but where individuals share models
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(r), the LML is additive over individuals in the sense that for the set of individuals N
l1 (N ; r) =
X
n2N
l (n; r) (13)
and for a class of models we can dene:
l1 (N ; R) = ln
 X
r2R
el1(N ;r)
#R
!
(14)
l0 (N ; r) and l0 (N ; R) we refer to as Level 0 log marginal likelihoods and and l1 (N ; r) and l1 (N ; R)
as Level 1 LML.
Finally, we dene the marginal likelihoods which model over the model class where common
parameters nor common model are imposed on individuals. Dene an index of models for all
individuals  = (r1; ::::::::rN) with a restriction that each rn 2 R for all n = 1; :::::N (but with no
requirement that rn = rn unless n = n) and the set of all such model combinations as 
 (R) :
We assume that all elements of 
 (R) are equally likely a priori, and equally likely to apply to all
individuals, then the prior probability for  is (#R)N and the LML is
l2 (N ; R) = ln
X
2
(R)
e
(
P
n2N l(n;rn))
#
(R) (15)
We refer to this quantity as the Level 2 LML. Note, that under the restriction that r1 = r2 = :::: =
rN ; l2 (N ; R) collapses to l1 (N ; R).
Model Probabilities
Individual model probabilities can be constructed using:
f (mn;rjyn) = f (ynjmn;r) f (mr)
f (yn)
=
el(n;r)f (mn;r)
f (yn)
(16)
where under equal prior odds for all models applying to all individuals f (mn;r) = 1#R , then usingP
r2R f (mn;rjyn) = 1; the probability for individual n having model mr is:
n;r =
el(n;r)P
r2R e
l(n;r)
(17)
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N ;r is the probability that model r can be applied to all individuals, and is dened as
N ;r =
el(N ;r)P
r2R e
l(N ;r) (18)
and likewise, the probability that a class of models (R) pertain to an individual
n;R =
el(n;R)P
R2R e
l(n;R)
(19)
The LMLs form the framework of comparisons for models, and penalise those models with
more parameters. The values of l (n; r) or l0 (N ; r) are estimated after simulation of the posterior
distribution of the models, using the method of Gelfand and Dey (1994), which is also outlined in
Koop 2003 the associated estimates for , l1 (N ; R), l2 (N ; R) n;r etc., can then be calculated using
the relationships above. For set where (#R)N is large l2 (N ; R) cannot be feasibly calculated as
above. However, using a proposal density for  based on the posterior probabilities, l2 (N ; R) can
be estimated to a high degree of accuracy by simulation.
Within the paper the set R will usually be a model class dened by a particular aspect form.
For example RA could refer to all the models with the POWER-I value form and RB the set of
models with the QUADRATIC value form. Alternatively, RA and RB can be dened by the
absence of these forms. : Thus, for example a Bayes Ratio of 10 would, under uniform model,
priors indicate that the model space with higher LML was 10 times as likely compared to the lesser
one. In our empirical section we report logged Bayes Ratios since the raw ones can be very large.
We also calculate and present the individual model probabilities n;R as histograms in the empirical
section. These probabilities are also used to produce weighted estimates of "quantities of interests"
: For example, if an individual has n;r under model r, then a model averaged estimate of this
quantity can be obtained using
n;R =
X
r2R
n;rn;r (20)
While we have calculated these for a wide range of parameters, we present only the model averaged
estimates of the probability weighting functions due to space constraints.
Appendix A4: The Adaptive MCMC sampler.
The following sequence was used:
Step 1: There was a initial random walk Metropolis-Hastings phase of 5,000 draw in order to
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reach a starting point for phase 2
Step 2: A heated random walk phase of 50,000 draws from which a multivariate normal
proposal density was constructed. This proposal was a mixture of
f (x) =
1
2
N

^; ^

+
1
2
N

^; 3~

where ^ and ^ were the mean and variance of the sample from the heated random walk phase, and
~ was a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
n
^ii
o
. The draws for this phase were not used as
posterior samples, but only in the construction of the initial proposal densities.
Step 3: 100,000 draws were then taken using the f (x) as the proposal, with the proposal being
updated every 100 iterations. At the end of this phase convergence was tested, and if it passed
then moved to step 4 and if it did not pass Step 5.
Step 4: Estimates and the marginal likelihood was calculated using the method of Gelfand and
Dey (1994) with a multivariate normal tuning density (see Koop, 2003).
Step 5: If convergence had not been achieved then the number of draws from the sampler was
doubled and convergence retested. Sample size were doubled continuously until convergence of the
model was achieved.
We employed two tests. First, the convergence diagnostic outlined in Koop (2003), and second,
a requirement that the serial correlation of the thinned sequence of 10,000 draws constructed from
the 100,000 had a serial correlation of less than 0.5. The entire estimation process was run twice so
to check if there were any substantial di¤erences. There were no substantive di¤erences in the two
runs. Finally, where results were obtained that seemed unusual, these models were investigated
more closely to uncover any problems. However, while there were a few of these cases, there was
no evidence that they are due to estimation problems. Note that updating of the proposal density
violates as in step 3 reversibility of the chain. However, as outlined in Andrieu and Johannes (2008),
this updating is allowed providing it obeys the principle of vanishing adaptation.
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